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Partnership Governance of Large Firms
Larry E. Ribsteint
This Article examines private-equity firms as an example of "uncorporate" structures
in the governance of large firms. Other examples include master limited partnerships, real
estate investment trusts, hedge funds, and venture capital funds. These firms can be seen as
an alternative to the corporate form in dealing with the central problem of aligning man-
agers' and owners' interests. In the standard corporate form, shareholders monitor power-
ful managers by voting on directors and corporate transactions, suing for breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and selling control These mechanisms deal with managerial agency costs by
relying on other agents, including auditors, class action lawyers, judges, independent di-
rectors, and shareholder intermediaries such as mutual and pension funds. Uncorporations
substitute other devices for corporate-type monitoring, including more closely tying manag-
ers' economic wellbeing to the firm's fortunes and greater assurance of distributions to own-
ers. This Article also explores the implications of this analysis for the corporate tax, the
enforcement of firms' contractual arrangements, and the future of publicly held firms.
INTRODUCTION
The modem corporation has been an important engine of busi-
ness development. It provides a mechanism for centralizing manage-
ment in powerful managers, and thereby a framework for long-term
strategic planning and the type of execution essential to large firms.
But it also presents the challenge of ensuring that these powerful
managers act in investors' interests.
While commentators and policymakers debate how to tweak cor-
porate governance to ensure managers' accountability to owners, many
large firms have turned to a distinctly different partnership form.' Li-
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mited partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs) provide for
the centralized management that is appropriate for large firms. At the
same time, these firms align managers' and owners' interests by mak-
ing the managers partners in the firm, committing them to make dis-
tributions to owners, and providing for a limited term. These incentive
and disciplinary mechanisms substitute for costlier and often ineffective
corporate-type monitoring devices, including the use of independent
directors, owner voting, and fiduciary duties.
This Article highlights distinctions between partnership and corpo-
rate approaches to governance and shows the extent to which the part-
nership form is spreading to large firms. This trend suggests that Michael
Jensen was mostly right in predicting the "eclipse" of public corporations,2
except that the leveraged buyout firms that Jensen focused on are just
one part of a larger partnership universe. This Article also explores the
implications of this analysis for the corporate tax, the enforcement of
firms' contractual arrangements, and the future of publicly held firms.
I. CORPORATE VERSUS PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE APPROACHES
This Part analyzes particular governance features, showing why
partnerships may entail lower total agency costs than corporations by
taking into account both the benefits of these features in aligning man-
agers' and owners' interests, and the costs of corporate-type monitoring.
A. Distributions
Constraining managers' discretion to retain earnings reduces share-
holders' need to monitor how managers use the cash. Thus, forcing man-
tract terms, filling gaps in the association's contract, and the application of tax and regulatory rules.
See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence
from LLCs, 73 Wash U L Q 369 (1995) (discussing the functions of statutory business associations).
In comparing partnerships and corporations, this Article focuses on features common to all partner-
ship-type firms, and particularly limited partnerships and limited liability companies-the partner-
ship forms that are particularly important to large firms. The reasons why partnership-type business
associations have developed features distinct from the corporation are beyond the scope of this
short Article and are discussed elsewhere. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 Berkeley
Bus L J 183,190 (2004).
2 See Michael C Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 Harv Bus Rev 61,61 (Sept/Oct
1989), revised by Michael C Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation (1997), online at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=146149 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (arguing that leveraged buyouts and private firms
that rely on debt for operation have overcome an important drawback of the public corporation and
that the public corporation has outlived its usefulness in many parts of the economy).
3 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am Econ
Rev 650, 654 (1984) (explaining that when earnings are given to shareholders and not retained,
the corporation is forced to go into the market to raise cash and is subjected to market scrutiny).
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agers to distribute the firm's earnings to its owners can be an efficient
way to constrain agency costs.
Though both partnerships and corporations can specify in their
governance documents managers' obligations to make periodic distri-
butions of cash, the commitment is more likely to bind managers in
partnerships than in corporations. Corporate law traditionally limits
enforcement of contractual constraints on board discretion. Some cor-
porate statutes provide for enforcement of restrictions on basic board
functions such as deciding when to declare dividends in close corpora-
tions. This implies that a general statutory authorization of charter pro-
visions on board power may not cover a standard corporation's limita-
tion of basic board powers.! Moreover, even if the corporate charter
technically can mandate distributions, courts could qualify enforcement
of these provisions consistent with strong corporate norms of giving
managers discretion to make these determinations.8
In partnerships, by contrast, there is no formal provision for a board
of directors, and therefore clearly no concern about contracts constrain-
ing the board's discretion. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Code, by tax-
ing the firm's income directly to the owners, encourages partners to insist
on distributions and undercuts any norm of board power to retain earn-
ings. Indeed, even without explicit contractual provisions, courts have
recognized the effect of the partnership tax penalty on earnings reten-
tion and penalized managers who failed to distribute cash to partners. '
4 See, for example, Clark v Dodge, 199 NE 641,643 (NY 1936) (qualifying enforcement of
a provision to distribute a certain percentage of earnings to the manager by requiring that direc-
tors exercise good faith discretion to ensure adequate retention of earnings).
5 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann §§ 350-51 (Michie).
6 8 Del Code Ann § 141(a) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.").
7 Section 356 of the Delaware Code provides that the close corporation subchapter does
not invalidate provisions authorized under other section& See 8 Del Code Ann § 356. However,
an open-ended interpretation of this provision seemingly conflicts with the statute's specific
provisions authorizing flexibility in carefully defined close corporations.
8 See Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 1159,
1218-19,1223-28 (2004) (discussing the well-established law and business norms giving directors
discretion over the payment of dividends and retention of earnings). These norms are evident in
interpretations of dividend provisions in preferred share contracts. For example, courts have en-
forced directors' discretion not to distribute dividends to noncumulative preferred shareholders,
even where this meant that the shareholders would forever lose the right to the cash. See, for
example, Guttman v Illinois Central Railroad Co, 189 F2d 927,931 (2d Cir 1951).
9 See IRC § 701.
10 See generally Labovitz v Dolan, 545 NE 2d 304 (I11 App 1989) (finding a breach of fidu-
ciary duty where withholding distributions enabled a squeeze-out of partners); Alloy v Wills Family
Trust, 944 A2d 1234 (Md App 2008) (relying on Labovitz to reach the same conclusion).
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B. Liquidation
Firms can constrain managers' control of the cash not only by
compelling periodic distributions but also by setting a time for termi-
nation and liquidation. Managers who periodically have to return to
the capital markets to raise cash are continually exposed to the discip-
line of the capital markets. As with distribution obligations, this makes
monitoring managers' conduct less necessary.
As with compelled distributions, limited duration is more likely to
be enforceable in partnerships than in corporations. These terms are con-
sistent with traditional partnership default rules providing for an agreed
term or undertaking1 and for a specific dissolution date.2 By contrast,
in corporate law such provisions would be contrary to the corporate
norm of perpetual existence and the board's power to decide whether
to initiate dissolution and other fundamental transactions.'3 These norms
and provisions provide a context for judicial interpretation and en-
forcement of liquidation provisions in standard-form corporations."'
C. Managers As Owners
Though large firms tend to be centrally managed, corporations and
partnerships differ in their approaches to centralized management.
11 See Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (RUPA) § 602(b)(2), 6 Pt I ULA 1, 169
(West 2001) (stating that partner disassociation is wrongful if done before the expiration of a
specified term or before the completion of a specified undertaking); Uniform Partnership Act
(1914) (UPA) § 31(1)(b), 6 Pt II ULA 1,370 (West 2001) ("Dissolution is caused ... [bly the express
will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified."). These provi-
sions apply to limited partnerships under some statutes The Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act (1976) (RULPA), with 1985 amendments, 6 ULA 125 (West 2003), does not provide for
a term, but § 1105 of RULPA provides for application of the UPA in cases not provided for in its
own statutory language. See RULPA § 1105,6A ULA 125,547 (West 2003).
12 See RULPA § 201(a)(4), 6A ULA at 267 (cited in note 11) (requiring the partnership
certificate to state the latest date on which the partnership is to dissolve). But see Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA) § 104(c), 6A ULA 18 (West 2003) ("A limited partnership has a per-
petual duration.").
13 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 275(a) (requiring dissolution to be initiated by
board resolution).
14 Liquidation provisions may work in non-standard form corporations such as special
purpose acquisition corporations (SPACs), which commit either to finding a target or liquidating
within a set period. See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 Colum Bus L Rev 172,
225. SPACs are a rare example of a partnership-type limited term in the corporate form. Since
SPACs exist either to buy or liquidate, a court probably would fully enforce the liquidation term as
clearly inherent in the deal.
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Corporations clearly separate ownership and management functions,5
while partnerships tend to combine them.
To be sure, there is no rule of corporate law that prevents managers
from being significant owners. Indeed, corporate managers frequently
do get stock or stock option compensation. However, there are several
factors inhibiting corporate managers from being full-fledged partners.
First, compensation creates owner-like incentives only if managers can-
not manipulate their compensation to avoid downside risk. In fact,
there is evidence that managers have used their substantial discretion to
insulate themselves from the full risks of stock ownership. 6 Partnerships
protect against such manipulation by embedding partners' compensa-
tion terms in the governance agreement.
Second, it is not clear that corporate shareholders would even want
their managers to be compensated just like owners. Such compensation
would force managers to hold large, undiversified financial investments
in the corporation in addition to their nondiversifiable human capital.
Managers therefore would have an incentive to be more risk averse
than the diversified public shareholders would want them to be, includ-
ing by excessively retaining cash for rainy days. Partnerships mitigate the
effect of this conflict of interest by forcing managers to distribute cash."
Third, politics constrain compensation in publicly held corporations
on the upside just as managerial risk aversion constrains it on the down-
side. Unions and other activist shareholders might object to high mana-
gerial compensation even if managers also face significant negative expo-
sure. These groups would have less of an opportunity to express political
objections in closely held private-equity portfolio firms, or even in public-
ly held partnerships, because of their weak voting rights in those firms.'8
D. The Monitoring Board
Corporate and partnership management differ in that corporations
have formal boards of directors that are subject to significant require-
ments regarding independence, that have substantial statutory powers,
that must approve significant transactions, and that must periodically
15 See generally Eugene R Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J L & Econ 301 (1983) (outlining control, management, and ownership functions).
16 See Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Executive Compensation 7 (Harvard 2004).
17 The distribution constraint also helps ensure that partnerships will not be used to oper-
ate large startup-phase firms, which further mitigates the potential conflict between managers
and owners. However, as discussed in Part III.A, partnerships can be used to fund these firms,
and therefore are instrumental in their governance.
18 See text accompanying note 23.
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stand for election.'9 Because corporate directors are charged with moni-
toring managers, they should not have obvious incentives to side with
managers and must be meaningfully subject to shareholder control.
Although partnership and LLC agreements also can provide for
boards of directors, these boards are not subject to rigid statutory rules
or customs. Partnership boards generally advise rather than monitor
the managers. Partnerships do not need a monitoring board because
they provide for other constraints on managers, including the incentives
and disciplinary schemes discussed above. This may reduce total agency
costs, given the costs of ensuring director independence and doubts
about independent directors' effectiveness.2
E. Owner Voting Rights
Owner voting rights play an important role in monitoring the cor-
poration and are aligned with ownership in order to give shareholders
the right incentives to perform this role.n By contrast, limited partners
have few voting rights under partnership statutes. Although partner-
ship agreements may provide for limited partner voting, the statutory
default rules suggest that partner voting rights would not be subject to
19 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Gover-
nance, 97 Nw U L Rev 547,552,559 (2003) (articulating the "director primacy" theory of corporate
governance, which places the board at the center of the nexus of contracts comprising the corpora-
tion). See also generally Ralph D. Ward, 21st Century Corporate Board (John Wiley & Sons 1997); Ada
Demb and E Friedrich Neubauer, The Corporate Board Confronting the Paradoxes (Oxford 1992).
20 Some types of partnerships may be subject to specific statutory requirements, particularly
mutual funds regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940. See 15 USC § 80a-3. See also text
accompanying note 60. However, limited partnerships, because of their "unique attributes," are
exempt from many (though not all) of the independent director rules in the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) Listed Company Manual. See NYSE, Listed Company Manual § 303A.00, online at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422
.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm-section.html (visited Jan 11, 2009) (describing the requirements for
exchange-listed companies).
21 The evidence shows that there is no overall positive relationship between various meas-
ures of firm welfare and the degree of board independence. See Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black,
The Non-correlation between Board Independence and Long-term Firm Performance, 27 J Corp
L 231,263 (2002).
22 See Robert B. Thompson and Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 Vand L Rev 129,
138 (2009) (arguing that shareholder voting performs an "error-correcting" function).
23 The 1985 RULPA, on which most current state statutes are based, does not provide for
limited partner voting rights See RULPA § 302 comment, 6A ULA 321-22 (stating that § 302 only
makes clear that the partnership agreement "may" grant voting power to limited partners). The
ULPA of 2001 provides for unanimous partner approval of certain significant acts such as amend-
ment of the agreement. However, it provides no default right to elect periodically the firm's
managers. See ULPA § 406(b)(1), 6A ULA 1, 58 (West 2003) (requiring the consent of each
partner to amend the agreement or sell, lease, or dispose of all or substantially all of the limited
partnership's property).
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the same level of judicial protection as corporate voting.' Limited part-
nerships have alternative ways to induce managers to act in owners'
interests, such as profit-based compensation, liquidation rights, and
cash distributions.
Substituting alternative constraints on managers for owner voting
may be efficient because corporate shareholder voting is not only costly
but may not be very effective. First, there is the free-rider problem:
public shareholders' ownership of only a small portion of the stock dis-
courages them from aggressive action because they have to share the
fruits of their labors with other owners.
Second, shareholders who do act may have interests that are in-
consistent with those of other corporate owners." For example, union
pension funds may seek leverage in labor negotiations by embarrassing
the issuer's managers. Indeed, it is often reasonable to assume that a
shareholder who actively participates despite significant free riding is
pursuing a private financial or political interest. Large or controlling
shareholders also may seek to extract private benefits or have interests
that conflict with those of diversified shareholders who are insulated
from firm-specific risks.
Third, logistical problems inherent in share voting reduce its effec-
tiveness as a monitoring device. Derivatives and hedging strategies let
shareholders separate ownership and control of their shares by encum-
bering or selling the voting right to a third party, thereby undercutting
24 But see NYSE, Listed Company Manual at § 303A.00 (cited in note 20).
25 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
L Rev 601, 634 n 88 (2006) ("[T]he most activist institutions-union and state and local em-
ployee pension funds-may have interests that diverge substantially from those of other inves-
tors"). For discussions of the incentives of activist shareholders, see Stewart J. Schwab and Ran-
dall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96
Mich L Rev 1018, 1033-34 (1998); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum L Rev 795,798,801-19 (1993).
26 For discussions of the policy implications of these structures, see Thompson and Edelman,
Corporate Voting 22 (cited in note 22) (describing how financial innovation enables providers to
"slice and dice" shareholders' interests in a multiplicity of ways); Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard
Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U Pa L
Rev 625, 632-36 (2008) (showing the extent of decoupling of ownership and voting rights by both
corporations and shareholders, as well as proposing regulatory responses); Henry T.C. Hu and
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S
Cal L Rev 811, 815-16 (2006) (describing how shareholders and corporations can separate eco-
nomic ownership and voting rights in ways that are not evident to other shareholders and pro-
posing greater disclosure); Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading As an
Incentive Device, 40 UC Davis L Rev 21,23-37 (2006) (arguing that outsider trading can contribute
to social welfare by giving traders incentives to generate new information); Shaun Martin and
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U Ill L Rev 775, 775 (criticizing the one-share, one-vote
system whenever there are outstanding shares that are "economically and legally encumbered").
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the incentive rationale for shareholder voting. The technology of share-
holder voting also may inhibit its effectiveness because of delayed deli-
very of materials, defective counting of votes, voting of loaned shares,
and incidental discrepancies between ownership and voting rights."
Fourth, some corporations, including media firms such as the New
York Times, formally separate ownership and voting rights through mul-
tiple classes of stock. These devices approximate voting rights in large
partnerships but without the incentives and discipline that partner-
ships substitute for voting rights.8
F. Fiduciary Duties
Corporate managers' fiduciary duties supplement shareholder mon-
itoring power. But strong fiduciary duties may be unnecessary in large
partnerships because of partnerships' other constraints on managers'
conduct, as discussed above.
Many corporate statutes, importantly including Delaware's," let
firms waive the duty of care but not the duty of loyalty. Moreover,
firms may not waive the duty of good faith, which may entail liability
even without disloyalty) By contrast, Delaware's LLC and limited
27 See Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 George-
town L J 1227, 1279-80 (2008) (arguing that these problems undermine arguments for more
extensive shareholder voting rights and, more fundamentally, the legitimacy of shareholder-elected
boards of directors, which are at the center of the accepted scheme of corporate governance).
28 For evidence of the negative effects on share value of separating insider control from cash-
flow rights, see, for example, Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang, and Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-
class Companies, 64 J Fin (forthcoming 2009), online at http://www.afajof.org/afa/forthcoming
/4568.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) (finding that insiders who have greater voting rights relative to
their financial interest in the company promote private benefits, reducing the value to share-
holders); Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance:An Analysis of
Dual-class Firms in the United States *32 (Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Work-
ing Paper No 12-04, May 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=562511 (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(finding that "firm value is positively associated with insiders' cash-flow rights and negatively
associated with insiders' voting rights"); Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of
Control:An International Comparison, 59 J Fin 537, 538-39 (2004) (engaging in an international
empirical cross-sectional study of the private benefits of control); Stijn Claessens, et al, Disentan-
gling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J Fin 2741, 2743 (2002)
(finding that the allocation of cash-flow rights to the largest shareholders has positive incentive
effects on overall firm value); Harry DeAngelo and Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of
Voting Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J Fin Econ 33,
60 (1985) (examining dual-class firms and finding that managerial vote ownership is an important
aspect of corporate structure).
29 See Del Gen Corp L § 102(b)(7)(i)-(iv) (allowing limitations on director liability except
in cases of bad faith, breaches of loyalty, or improper personal benefit).
30 See Stone v Ritter, 911 A2d 362, 365 (Del 2006) (holding that the board's conscious
failure to adopt a compliance program in the face of a known duty to act may constitute a breach
of good faith that survives a fiduciary duty waiver in the charter).
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partnership statutes permit firms to waive completely fiduciary duties."
Delaware courts have carefully interpreted agreements to determine
the extent to which they waive fiduciary duties.3 Good faith in the
partnership context is only a rule of flexible contract interpretation33
rather than an aspect of the duty of loyalty as it is in the corporate con-
text. The Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has suggested
that courts should fill any gaps in the parties' express intent by applying
the "implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, rather
than the enigmatic 'good faith' fiduciary duty at common law.""a
Partnerships' contractual discipline and incentives can be at least as
effective as fiduciary duties in curbing agency costs. Fiduciary duties re-
quire enforcement by derivative plaintiffs and their lawyers who, like
corporate managers, may have interests different from those of the own-
ers. 35 Moreover, judges are legitimately concerned about second-guessing
managers' judgments and thereby deterring managers and directors
from making the sort of risky decisions that diversified shareholders
would want them to make. The business judgment rule therefore bars
liability for all but the most egregious or disloyal managerial decisions.3
G. Market for Control
Corporate bidders' ability to buy shares and aggregate voting rights
in target firms allows for a market for corporate control that strengthens
31 See 6 Del Code Ann §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (stating that the only nonwaivable duty is
the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing). At least thirteen other state LLC statutes
provide for waiver of fiduciary duties without specific restrictions. See Larry E. Ribstein and Robert
Keatinge, 3 Ribstein & Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies Appx A (West 2008).
32 For discussions of how the Delaware courts interpret fiduciary duty waivers in limited
partnership and LLC agreements, see generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Cor-
porate Indeterminacy, 2009 U Bl L Rev 131.; Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited
Partnership Agreements, 37 Suffolk U L Rev 927 (2004).
33 See Ribstein, 2009 U Ill L Rev at 163 (cited in note 32) (suggesting that Delaware
courts' flexible interpretation of limited partnership contracts allows parties to avoid "the insta-
bility and indeterminacy of corporate fiduciary jurisprudence").
34 Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships
and Limited Liability Companies, 32 Del J Corp L 1, 1 (2007) (summarizing the Chief Justice's
argument that limited partnerships and LLCs should be free to adopt or waive the fiduciary
duties recognized at common law).
35 See generally John C Coffee, Jr, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum
L Rev 669 (1986) (discussing incentive problems of lawyers in class action and derivative suits).
36 See, for example, In re Walt Disney Co Derivative Litigation, 906 A2d 27, 70-73 (Del
2006) (finding no cause of action against corporate managers who had spent $140 million to hire
and fire an evidently incompetent president).
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shareholder voting rights." In contrast, partners and LLC members gen-
erally cannot freely transfer management and control rights.3 As with
other corporate monitoring devices, mechanisms such as distribution of
earnings and owner-like managerial incentives substitute for the market
for corporate control. Again, this substitution can be effective because
of the cost and limited effectiveness of the relevant corporate monitor-
ing device. The disciplinary effect of the control market is limited by
incumbent managers' significant power to block hostile bids. Courts
understandably are as reluctant to second-guess takeover defenses as
they are other business decisions,39 and managers can easily circumvent
limits by finding equally effective defenses that are not restricted.40
II. PRIVATE EQUITY As PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE
Private-equity buyout firms are a leading example of the use of
partnership mechanisms in governing large firms. Though private-
equity portfolio firms may continue to use the corporate form, part-
nerships exercise control, and the partnership mechanisms discussed
in Part I determine how they exercise this control.
Buyouts are financed by funds organized as limited partnerships
managed by the buyout firm's general partners. The funds have sever-
al of the standard partnership features discussed in Part I. First, man-
agers are motivated by high-powered incentive compensation." Fund
partners earn an average 2 percent fee based on assets managed and
20 percent of the fund's profits, or "carry," over a threshold amount.
The partners also own significant equity in the fund, giving them sub-
stantial upside profit and downside risk.
37 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J Polit Econ
110, 112-14 (1965) (arguing that control of a corporation is a valuable asset that exists indepen-
dently of merger incentives such as economies of scale or monopoly profits).
38 For provisions permitting transfer only of partners' or members' economic rights in
partnerships and LLCs, see RUPA § 502,6 Pt I ULA 156; ULPA § 701 comment 1, 6A ULA 80;
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006) § 502(a)(3), 6A ULA 213, 264 (West
Supp 2007).
39 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Ta-
keovers, 31 Del J Corp L 769 (2006) (showing the limits of judicial scrutiny of managerial acts in
defending against takeovers).
40 See Jennifer Arlen and Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder
Choice, 152 U Pa L Rev 577, 583 (2003) (discussing managers' incentives to block takeovers by
utilizing tactics that cannot be regulated).
41 See Ulf Axelson, Per Strbmberg, and Michael S. Weisbach, Why are Buyouts Levered?
The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds *33 (forthcoming J Fim 2009), online at http://ssrn.
con/abstract=676546 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
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Second, partners are automatically cashed out of the fund on ex-
piration of the fund's limited term, thus limiting managers' control of
the cash. This provides a "clear deadline for [the general partner] to
show results, and so is an incentive device to make [the general partner]
improve portfolio companies."4 The fund's promoters therefore have to
focus on getting portfolio companies in shape for resale in a public
offering or secondary private-sale market. The buyout fund includes
features designed to mitigate managers' incentive to take excessive risk
toward the end of the fund's limited term: the fund pools investments
from several buyouts, so losses of failed buyouts are subtracted from
the profits of successes; and each buyout must seek additional financing
from third parties rather than simply drawing from the fund.3
Third, limited partnership agreements provide some assurance of
distributions rather than giving managers wide discretion to invest earn-
ings in new projects." Like the limited term, this forces managers to face
the capital market's judgment of their success rather than continue to
manage the investors' funds for an indefinite period.
Fourth, the discipline provided by the above features substitutes
for corporate-type monitoring. The equity owners of the buyout fund
typically have only minimal voting rights,45 and managers have sharply
constrained fiduciary duties.4' Managers' investment incentives pro-
vided by pooling of ex ante passive investments and market scrutiny
of individual deals through ex post debt financing reduce limited part-
ners' need to vote on or seek judicial review of the fund's investments.
Substituting these incentive devices for monitoring is a particularly
efficient tradeoff in private-equity firms given the high costs of con-
straining the discretion of expert managers.
III. BEYOND PRIVATE EQUITY
This Part shows that private equity is only part of a much larger
trend toward the use of partnerships in governing large firms. It ex-
amines three other examples: venture capital (VC) firms, hedge funds,
42 Id at 37 (suggesting that agency problems between limited and general partners are the
likely reason why private-equity funds have a finite life).
43 See id at 30 (showing the benefit of using banks or other third parties as a source of deal-
by-deal financing once the fund is operating).
44 See id at 33.
45 For an example, see text accompanying note 76.
46 See note 68 and accompanying text.
47 See Axelson, Strdmberg, and Weisbach, Why Are Buyouts Levered? at 22 (cited in note
41) (noting that "giving limited partners decision rights over individual deals would lower the ex-
pected quality of investments that are undertaken").
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and publicly traded partnerships. In the first two, as in private equity,
partnerships hold the critical governance levers of portfolio firms that
may be organized as corporations. In the last example, the partnership
form takes center stage in the operating firm.
A. Venture Capital
Although venture capital portfolio companies may start small,
they are thought to be headed for growth and an eventual public offer-
ing, and are therefore appropriate for a large-firm corporate-type struc-
ture. However, as with private equity, partnerships play an important
role here in funding and governance.
Venture capital funds, which are organized as limited partnerships,
specialize in buying equity (usually preferred) shares in startup-phase
firms." As in private-equity limited partnerships, VC general partners
exercise extensive management power, and their incentives are aligned
with investors' interests through profit-sharing.9 VC fund agreements
provide partnership-type discipline by constraining the managers' con-
trol of the cash. For example, by permitting staged investments, the
agreement effectively lets investors put their interests back to the firm
by walking away from further contribution obligations.'o
There is evidence that these "walkaway" rights negatively corre-
late with the use of governance devices such as boards.' This provides
some indication of substitution of partnership discipline for corporate-
type monitoring. However, VC fund boards appear to function more
as advisors than monitors.52 This indicates that even where a partner-
ship uses a corporate-type device, its design may be altered to reflect
other aspects of the partnership's governance structure.
Venture capital fund agreements also include covenants forbid-
ding particular behavior that creates a high potential for conflicts, such
48 See Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle 8 (MIT 1999) (discussing
the limited partnership structure of venture capital investments).
49 See Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds *10-14
(Swedish Institute for Financial Research Conference on Economics of the Private Equity Mar-
ket, Sept 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996334 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (discussing com-
pensation in VC funds).
50 See Kate Litvak, Firm Governance As a Determinant of Capital Lock-in *6-7 (University
of Texas Law and Economics Research Paper No 95, Mar 2007), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=
915004 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of staged investment strate-
gies as opposed to long-term investments and noting that VC firms tend to be stage-oriented).
51 See id at *8, *20, *30.
52 See Brian Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in VC-backed Firms *34-35 (UC
Berkeley School of Law Working Paper, Oct 2008), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=1162372
(visited Jan 11, 2009).
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as particular types of investments or raising money for new funds.3
Like other partnership-type devices, these covenants provide direct
discipline rather than obliging members to monitor the quality of
managers' transactions.
B. Hedge Funds
Activist hedge funds differ from mutual funds and traditional share-
holder activists because they can take larger positions than institutional
shareholders and mutual funds, which have diversified portfolios. These
hedge funds thereby mitigate the free-rider problem that inhibits cor-
porate shareholders from aggressively monitoring managers. 1
As with venture capital and private equity, partnership features
enable activist hedge funds to accomplish their objectives." Hedge
funds are commonly organized as limited partnerships and exhibit all
of the standard differences between corporations and partnerships.
First, hedge funds may include provisions limiting managers' control
over the cash by providing for distributions to the partners.6
Second, hedge fund managers are general partners with high-
powered, owner-like incentives. Their fees are at the level of private-
53 See Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle at 37-42 (cited in note 48).
54 For data and analyses of activist hedge funds' role in corporate governance, see Robin
Greenwood and Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers *21 (Harvard Business School
Working Paper No 08-004, May 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003792 (visited Jan 11,
2009) (suggesting that increased returns from companies with activist hedge fund shareholders
are due to merger activity); April Klein and Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism:
Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J Fin (forthcoming 2009), online at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=913362 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (discussing the differences between hedge fund activists
and other activist investors); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds
As Shareholder Activists, 14 J Corp Fin 323,328-29 (2008) (showing greater shareholder returns
in companies where hedge funds have taken an active, rather than passive, interest); Jiekun Huang,
Hedge Fund Activism in Leveraged Buyouts *2-4 (Boston College Department of Finance, Nov
2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086687 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (discussing how the pres-
ence of activist hedge funds in both buyer firms and targets of buyouts is associated with abnormal-
ly high returns); Alon Brav, et al, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Perfor-
mance, 63 J Fin 1729, 1730-31 (2008) (discussing differences between hedge funds and other
institutional investors, including the ability of the former to make concentrated investments); Mar-
cel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155
U Pa L Rev 1021,1071-87 (2007) (discussing benefits and problems of hedge fund activism).
55 See generally Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 Berkeley Bus L J (forthcoming 2009), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1066808 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (analyzing hedge fund governance and the structure of
limited partnership hedge funds).
56 For example, in one hedge fund case the court noted that the investors' exclusive re-
course against bad management was the ability to withdraw their investments on a minimum of
six weeks' notice. See Anglo American Security Fund, LP v SR. Global International Fund, LP,
829 A2d 143,154 (Del Ch 2003).
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equity fund managers-15 to 20 percent of profits. 7 Hedge fund man-
agers also invest their own assets in their firms.m
Third, hedge funds' partnership discipline and incentives let them
shed corporate-type monitoring devices. For example, instead of gen-
eral fiduciary duties, hedge fund investors may contract for specific
individual rights.59 The enforceability of these contracts is supported by
the presumed sophistication of hedge fund investors.6° Investor sophis-
tication provides extra support for enforcing the firm's modification of
corporate-type fiduciary duties and remedies.'
C. Publicly Traded Partnerships
Publicly traded operating companies are organized as partner-
ships rather than simply being governed by partnerships as with the
business entities discussed above? Tax law plays an important role in
57 See Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds at *7-8 (cited in note 55). These fees
are possible because hedge funds are not subject to limits on the fees of mutual fund managers.
See 17 CFR § 275.205-3(a) (exempting advisers to hedge and private-equity funds from limitations
on performance fees); Larry E. Ribstein, Do the Mutuals Need More Law? Regulation Mag 15
(Spring 2004) (contrasting the regulation of hedge funds with that of mutual funds); Alan L.
Kennard, The Hedge Fund versus the Mutual Fund, 57 Tax L 133, 137-60 (2003) (discussing the
salient tax differences between hedge funds and mutual funds); William Fung and David A. Hsieh,
A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J Empirical Fin 309,313 (1999) (providing empirical data demonstrat-
ing the differences between hedge fund and mutual fund investment style and performance).
58 One study estimates the average investment by managers to be 7.1 percent of fund
assets, with the median manager owning 2.4 percent of the fund. See Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D.
Daniel, and Narayan Y. Naik, Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Per-
formance, J Fm *38 (forthcoming 2009), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=889008 (visited Jan 11,
2009) (showing evidence of an association between the level of manager co-investment and the
performance of the fund).
59 See Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds at *5-6 (cited in note 55) (sum-
marizing Delaware law allowing hedge fund general partners to contract out of fiduciary duties).
60 Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds avoid registering with the SEC by selling only to wealthy
or sophisticated investors See 15 USC § 80a-3(c) (exempting from registration funds whose securi-
ties are owned by not more than one hundred persons and funds whose securities are owned exclu-
sively by qualified purchasers). For the definition of "qualified purchaser," see 15 USC § 80a-
2(a)(51)(A).
61 See Anglo American Security Fund, 829 A2d at 154 ("The plaintiff limited partners each
appear to be sophisticated parties that understood and voluntarily accepted the terms of the
Agreement and assumed the risks of investing in the Fund in order potentially to reap the re-
wards of undertaking such risks").
62 Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are similar to publicly traded partnerships though
formally organized as corporations See Md Corp and Assoc Code Ann, § 8-101 et seq (Michie) (defin-
ing a REIT as an "unincorporated trust or association ... in which property is acquired, held .... or
disposed" and providing for the formation, amendment, and rights and liabilities of REITs). Under
the Internal Revenue Code, these firms get flow-through tax treatment if they invest at least 75
percent in real estate related assets and receive at least 75 percent of their income from these assets,
with the rest in and from cash or government securities. See IRC §§ 856(c)(3), (c)(4)(A), 857(b)(2)
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the extent to which partnerships can be used for this purpose. The In-
ternal Revenue Code permits partnership-type "flow-through" taxa-
tion in firms that mostly earn "qualifying income," defined to include,
among other things, interest, dividends, rents, and capital gains.? Pub-
licly traded partnerships (PTPs) (sometimes also known as "master li-
mited partnerships") are designed to fit within this exception.6 As of
July 2008, a trade group of PTPs listed over 100 members, mostly in
energy and natural resources.5
PTPs are best understood in terms of how their governance struc-
ture interacts with the application of partnership taxation. As dis-
cussed in Part I, flow-through partnership taxation reinforces manag-
ers' commitment to make distributions, which partnerships rely on to
constrain agency costs.6 PTP agreements typically complement tax law
by promising to distribute net cash less reserves, restricting specific
actions such as issuance of additional equity that might reduce distri-
butions, and giving the general partners significant financial incentives
to make distributions, as by increasing their distributions depending
on how much the firm distributes to the limited partners.67 Thus, unlike
corporate shareholders, but like private-equity, venture capital, and
hedge fund partners, PTP limited partners need not rely on corporate-
type monitoring. PTP agreements generally give limited partners only
(defining REIT and explaining a REIT's taxable income). Like partnerships, REITs substitute
partnership discipline and incentives for corporate-type monitoring. REITs, like partnerships,
also distribute most (specifically, 90 percent) of their income, except that for REITs this distribu-
tion is required in order to maintain their tax treatment. See IRC § 857(a). The tradeoff as in
partnerships, is that owner monitoring is constrained. Hostile takeovers are limited to costly proxy
contests, and the Internal Revenue Code restricts the extent to which a single owner can have a
control share by limiting the five largest shareholders of a REIT to no more than 50 percent own-
ership, with an exception for retirement plans. See IRC §§ 856(h), 542(a)(2).
63 See IRC § 7704(c)-(d).
64 For a general analysis of master limited partnership governance, see generally John
Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 Bus Law 471 (2005) (describing the struc-
ture of master limited partnerships, their tax treatment, and the legal framework within which
master limited partnerships are governed).
65 See National Association of Publicly Traded Partnerships, http'//www.naptp.org/Coalition
Membership/completeMembershipWithLinkshtm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (listing both publicly
traded partnerships and accounting, banking, and law firms).
66 The website for the National Association of Publicly Traded Partnerships prominently warns
that a FPT investor's "tax is based not on money he actually receives, but his proportionate share of
what the partnership earns." See National Association of Publicly Traded Partnerships, Facts & An-
swers about Publicly Traded Partnerships, online at http'lwww.naptp.org/PTP101/FAQs.htm (visited
Jan 11, 2009) (explaining the impact of pass-through taxation on individual investors' tax liabilities).
67 See Goodgame, 60 Bus Law at 447 (cited in note 64) (summarizing the distribution agree-
ments used by one of the larger publicly traded partnerships).
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minimal voting rights, sharply restrict fiduciary duties, and make hos-
tile takeovers very difficult.'
Private-equity firms have become PTPs by publicly selling shares in
the entity that manages and receives fees and profits from the private-
equity firm.6 These "privlic equity" firms,' like both their privately held
counterparts and conventional PTPs, substitute partnership-type incen-
tives and discipline for corporate-type monitoring. For example, the
owners of the managing general partner of the publicly traded Black-
stone Group own equity shares in the funds and will continue to re-
ceive directly a share of the carry.7' The Group, in turn, owns controlling
general partnership interests in the funds. As in other publicly traded
partnerships, taxing earnings, whether or not distributed, to the own-
ers should make them more averse than corporate shareholders to
earnings retention.7 2 Managers who retain earnings on which the uni-
68 See id at 493 (discussing voting rights of LPs); id at 494 (discussing fiduciary duty limitations);
id at 498 (discussing the difficulties in attempting a hostile takeover of a master limited partnership).
69 See, for example, Apollo Global Management LLC, Form S-i 64-74 (Apr 8,2008), online at
http://www.sec.gov/Archivesedgar/data1411494/000119312508077312/dsl.htm (visited Jan 11,
2009) (diagramming organizational structure and explaining the proposed reorganization); KKR &
Co LP, Form S-I 58-63 (July 3, 2007), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1404912
/000104746907005446/a2178646zs-l.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (diagramming organizational struc-
ture and explaining relationship between funds and manager); The Blackstone Group LP, Amend-
ment No 9 to Form S-i 69-78 (June 21, 2007), online at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
BXI245990728xOxS1047469-07-5100/1393818/filing.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) (describing organi-
zational structure). For a discussion of these IPOs, see Larry E. Ribstein, Going Privlic, The Ameri-
can (Mar 27, 2007), online at http://www.american.com/archive/2007/march-0307/going-privlic
(visited Jan 11, 2009) (discussing the Blackstone IPO and its private control characteristics). The
KKR and Apollo offerings were strictly mechanisms for existing owners to have publicly traded
shares rather than for the firms to raise capital. See Steven M. Davidoff, Plumbing the K.K.R. Un-
IPO, Dealbook Blog (NY Tunes July 31, 2008), online at http://dealbook.blogsnytimescom/
2008/07/31/plumbing-the-kkr-un-ipo/ (visited Jan 11, 2009) (describing KKR's transaction as an
equity exchange and not a standard public stock offering).
70 See Ribstein, Going Privlic (cited in note 69) (coining the term "privlic" to describe pri-
vate-equity firms that make public offerings to raise capital while retaining the corporate gover-
nance aspects of a limited partnership).
71 See The Blackstone Group LP, Amendment No 9 to Form S-i at 14-19 (cited in note 69).
Such incentives are also evident in the Och-Ziff offering in which the partners made an additional
$2 billion investment, described as "hurt" money-enough that the managers' risk of loss would be
significant in relation to their potential for upside gain from their management fees. See Och-Ziff
Capital Management Group LLC, Form S-i 7 (July 2,2007) online at http'//www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgardata1403256/000119312507147770/dsl.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (stating that existing
partners will invest all of their after-tax proceeds received from the share offering back into Och-
Ziff funds); William Hutchings, Och-Ziff Flotation Aims to Raise 'Hurt Money,' Fn News (July 17,
2007), online at http://www.efinancialnews~com/usedition/index/content/2448323994 (visited Jan 11,
2009) (subscription required) (explaining that partners in the Och-Ziff funds will increase their owner-
ship stake from 7 percent to 14 percent and have committed not to sell their shares for five years).
72 See text accompanying note 66.
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tholders are taxed are likely to be judged harshly in the capital markets
and thus face constraints on future capital-raising."
As a tradeoff for partnership discipline and incentives, "privlic"
equity firms eliminate the monitoring mechanisms that characterize the
corporate form. The Blackstone Group prospectus thus correctly calls
itself "a different kind of public company."7" Blackstone Group unit-
holders get almost no formal control rights. The LLC that manages the
Group is controlled by a board elected by the LLC members, not by
the Group or its unitholders. The prospectus makes clear that the uni-
tholders "will have only limited voting rights on matters affecting our
business and ... will have little ability to remove our general partner.""
Privlic equity firms also sharply restrict managers' fiduciary duties.
For example, The Blackstone Group limited partnership agreement
provides that the general partner may make decisions in its "sole dis-
cretion" considering any interests it desires, including its own. 6 The gen-
eral partner may resolve any conflict of interest between the Group and
the general partner as long as its decision is "fair and reasonable."" A
unitholder challenging the decision has the burden of proof on this
issue, and a decision approved by independent directors is conclusive-
ly deemed to be fair and reasonable and not a breach of duty. In addi-
tion, since the Group is a Delaware limited partnership, courts are likely
to enforce these limitations on fiduciary duties."
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This Part discusses the implications of the above analysis of the
use of partnership-type structures in large firms on the enforcement of
agreements in these firms, the future of public ownership, and the ap-
propriate limits of the corporate tax.
73 There is also support for fiduciary liability in this situation. See note 10 and accompany-
ing text. However, these remedies may be barred by the strong waiver provisions in Delaware
limited partnerships. See Ribstein, 37 Suffolk U L Rev at 963-64 (cited in note 32) (arguing that
the RULPA's approach to waiver provisions is misguided because it prevents the balancing ap-
proach used by Delaware courts).
74 The Blackstone Group LP, Amendment No 9 to Form S-1 at 11 (cited in note 69) (de-
scribing Blackstone's intention to preserve aspects of its culture that contributed to its success as
a private firm).
75 Id at 54 (listing as a risk factor the fact that existing owners will be able to determine the
outcome of "those few matters that may be" submitted for a vote).
76 Id at A-31 (stating that any decisions made by the general partner pursuant to its position
are presumed to demonstrate good faith and do not require a showing of fiduciary duty).
77 Id at 57 (contrasting the partnership agreement with Delaware corporation law, where a
conflict resolution by an interested party is presumed to be unfair).
78 See text accompanying note 31.
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A. Enforcement of Agreements
As emphasized throughout this Article, partnerships substitute ef-
fective incentive and disciplinary mechanisms for costly corporate mon-
itoring mechanisms such as owner voting and fiduciary duties. However,
courts may not enforce the elimination or extensive modification of
traditionally important monitoring devices such as owner voting and
fiduciary rights, especially in publicly held firms that seem to resemble
conventional corporations. Courts may be concerned about unsophisti-
cated public investors and potential conflicts between incoming public
investors and existing institutional and other sophisticated investors.m
There is an indication that Delaware courts are prepared to en-
force fiduciary duty waivers even in a publicly traded firm. The ques-
tion may be a closer one if a publicly held firm eliminates corporate-
type rights without substituting the partnership mechanisms discussed
in this Article such as buyout rights or limited terms. A firm arguably
should not be able to escape scrutiny simply by changing its name from
corporation to partnership. Rather, the lesson of this Article is that
courts need to consider the firm's entire bundle of rights and obliga-
tions before applying corporate restrictions on contracting.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Public Ownership
The rapid rise of private equity in the mid-2000s has been attri-
buted mainly to the costs of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
200281 (SOX) and the rising costs of litigation.2 However, this relation-
ship is unclear, as indicated by the fact that private-equity firms them-
selves have sought public ownership, and by evidence of a post-SOX
increase in the large firms that choose debt financing that triggers ap-
plication of SOX.3 In fact, partnership discipline and incentives may
79 See William A. Birdthistle and M.Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Deseg-
regation in Private Equity, 76 U Chi L Rev 45,58-59 (2009).
80 See Wood v Baum, 2008 WL 2600981, *2 (Del) (applying a broad exculpation from fidu-
ciary liability in an LLC operating agreement in determining the pleading standard for a demand
excuse in a derivative suit).
81 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, codified in relevant
part at 15 USC § 7201 et seq.
82 See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capi-
tal Markets Regulation 3-4 (Dec 5,2006), online at httpJ/www.capmktsreg.org/pdfsl.30Committee_
InterimReportREV2.pdf (visited Jan 11,2009) (finding that a series of improvements to the US
regulatory structure would improve the competitiveness of the nation's capital markets).
83 See Robert P Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms' Going-private Decisions, 76 U Chi L Rev 7,31-32 (2009) (finding that
the rate at which public firms remained subject to SOX reporting requirements following a going-
private transaction "consistently increased" between 2003 and 2006).
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constrain the agency costs of public ownership in some firms better
than does corporate monitoring.
Partnership-type governance may become even more important
in publicly held firms as they increasingly turn to risky derivatives and
insurance products. Although it has been argued that derivatives ena-
ble private equity by reducing the cost of debt, ' the partnership fea-
tures of private equity provide the discipline necessary for managing
complex instruments in public as well as private firms."
Partnerships are also particularly useful for firms like The Black-
stone Group that want to combine public ownership with highly skilled
professional management. For example, law and other professional
firms may want to give control shares to the insiders and noncontrol
shares to the outside investors.6 Though corporations can accomplish a
similar objective by using dual-class stock, this stock lacks the partner-
ship's agency-cost controls."
84 See Ronald J. Gilson and Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Owner-
ship, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum L Rev 231,235 (2008) (suggesting
that the recent increase in private-equity buyouts of public companies will change the way public
shareholders evaluate and assume risks in their investments).
85 See Ronald W. Masulis and Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?, 76 U
Chi L Rev 219, 351-52 (2009) (suggesting that concentrated ownership gives private-equity inves-
tors strong incentives and sufficient powers to monitor managers' risk-taking activities). It is worth
noting in this connection that Enron's use of derivatives was a significant factor in the market's
failure to understand the firm. See William C. Powers, Jr, Raymond S. Troubh, and Herbert S. Wino-
kur, Jr, Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of
Enron Corp, 2002 WL 198018, *67-71 (Feb 1, 2002) (describing LJM and Raptor transactions that
were presented as hedges but were actually bets on Enron's future stock price); Collapse of Enron
Corp, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan
24,2002) (testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law),
online at http://hsgac.senate.gov/012402partnoy.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (describing Enron's use of
derivatives to mask losses in asset value and unregulated OTC derivatives markets).
86 State law currently prohibits law firms from having nonlawyer owners. See, for example,
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (2008). However, recent developments suggest
that this barrier may be falling. The key developments are the recent IPO of the Australian law firm
Slater & Gordon, see Slater & Gordon Ltd, Prospectus 8,10-11 (Apr 13,2007), online at http'/www.
slatergordon.com.au/docs/prospectus/Prospectus.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009), and legal reforms in the
United Kingdom. With respect to potential business justifications for publicly traded law firms,
see Larry E. Ribstein, Want to Own a Law Firm?, The American (May 30,2007), online at http'/www.
american.com/archive may-0507/want-to-own-a-law-firm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (laying out a
case for why law firms should convert themselves into publicly traded entities); Larry E. Ribstein,
On My Mind- Lawyers Don't Make Enough, Forbes 40 (Oct 29,2007), online at http://members.forbes.
com/forbes/200711029/040.html (visited Jan 11, 2009) (comparing corporate lawyer salaries to the
salaries of bankers and business people who trade in the same type of investment and business advice).
For a general discussion of issues concerning publicly owned law firms, see Bruce MacEwen, Milton C.
Regan, Jr, and Larry E. Ribstein, Conversation, Law Firms; Ethics and Equity Capital, 21 Georgetown
J Legal Ethics 61 (2008) (summarizing an exchange of ideas between commentators regarding the
manner in which public ownership would change law firms' business models and the practice of law).
97 See text accompanying note 28.
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C. The Corporate Tax
This Article's analysis has implications for the application of cor-
porate taxation. Corporate managers and nonshareholder groups favor
the existing corporate governance equilibrium of what Mark Roe has
called "strong managers, weak owners." The tax on corporate distribu-
tions to owners gives managers an excuse to retain earnings. So it is
unsurprising that corporate managers promoted double taxation in
1936 as part of a deal to avoid an undistributed profits tax."9 Any effort
to curb significantly or to eliminate the tax on distributions would spur
opposition not only by politicians concerned about potential revenue
loss but also by managers who want to keep control over earnings.
The current law applying the corporate tax to most publicly traded
firms is not necessarily good public policy. Among other things, it encou-
rages firms to end-run the tax on distributions by using tax-deductible
debt. Although debt can create partnership-type discipline by forcing
distributions to investors and imposing constraints on managerial con-
duct, it is only a second-best alternative to partnership because it in-
creases the risk of costly bankruptcy.
The current exception from the corporate tax on publicly traded
firms is limited essentially to passive rent-collectors such as natural re-
source firms and real estate investment trusts." Although these firms
are especially appropriate for partnership-type discipline because
they can commit to making substantial distributions without jeopar-
dizing their business plan, they are not the only such firms. For exam-
ple, mature, slow-growth firms that get fairly predictable earnings
from established brands might derive comparable benefits from being
taxed as partnerships.
Congress should draw the corporate-partnership tax border with a
view to partnership taxation's governance function of mitigating agency
88 See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Cor-
porate Finance 3 (Princeton 1994) (describing the politics and history of how and why managers,
rather than shareholders, are the powerful decisionmakers in large US firms).
89 See Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double Taxation: A Clash over the Control of Corpo-
rate Earnings, in Steven A. Bank and Kirk J. Stark, eds, Business Tax Stories 153,154 (Foundation
2005) (examining the history and politics surrounding the repeal of the dividend tax exemption
and the rise of corporate double taxation); Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Cost% and
the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 167,183-98 (2002) (describing how agency-cost
problems associated with management lead managers to want to hold profits that shareholders
want distributed and the political climate and decisions leading to double taxation laws).
90 See note 62 (discussing special tax provisions for REITs).
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costs.91 Thus, firms should be able to balance the costs and benefits of the
tax as they do with other governance devices. In other words, firms' go-
vernance choices should determine the application of the tax rather
than vice versa. At the same time, Congress has to constrain firms' abili-
ty to elect the corporate tax in order to retain the tax's viability. One
approach would be to let firms choose to be taxed as partnerships if
they have substantially adopted partnership-type governance, includ-
ing by committing to distributions. This would be consistent with the
treatment of REITs, where the application of a partnership-type tax
turns to some extent on the firms' distribution of earnings."
CONCLUSION
The large firm has been thought to be the special province of the
corporate form. But this Article has described how partnerships can
provide an important alternative to the high costs of corporate gover-
nance of large firms. It also shows the extent to which partnerships cur-
rently are being used to govern large firms. This analysis has important
implications for, among other things, the structure of publicly held firms,
the application of the corporate tax, and the enforcement of governance
contracts. More generally, the Article suggests that theoretical and em-
pirical analysis of governance should look outside the corporate box
to partnership approaches to controlling agency costs in large firms.
91 This, of course, assumes the retention of the corporate tax, an issue that is beyond the
scope of the present Article.
92 See note 62.
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